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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Prosecution Of Baker In 
Kootenai County Was Barred By The Ada County Plea Agreement 
A. Introduction 
A Kootenai County jury found Baker guilty of 11 counts of violating a civil 
protection order that prohibited him from having any contact with his estranged 
wife. (R., pp.98-108, 122-32.) The district court ordered Baker's convictions 
vacated, concluding that the Kootenai County prosecution of Baker for the 11 
protection order violations occurring between May and September 2009 was 
barred by an Ada County plea agreement (entered into by Baker after the 
Kootenai County charges were filed, but before he was aware of them) whereby 
Baker pled guilty to one count of violating the protection order and the "state" 
agreed to not "file" or "pursue" any additional charges arising out of any 
violations of the order before February 17, 2010. (R., pp.213-31.) The district 
court erred because the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office (the prosecuting 
agency in the Kootenai County case) was not a party to the Ada County plea 
agreement, and the Boise City Attorney's Office (the prosecuting agency in the 
Ada County case) had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the Coeur 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office in the plea negotiations that resolved the Ada 
County case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-19.) 
Baker offers a number of arguments in response, all of which he contends 
support the district court's determination that the Kootenai County prosecution 
was barred by the Ada County plea agreement. First, he argues that the 
language of the Ada County plea agreement is ambiguous and, as such, must 
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be construed in his favor to bar the Kootenai County prosecution. (Respondent's 
brief, pp.5-7.) Second, he argues that, because venue over the Kootenai County 
charges was also proper in Ada County, the Boise City Attorney's Office had 
authority to prevent the prosecution of the civil protection order violations in 
Kootenai County. (Respondent's brief, pp.7-S.) Third, he argues that the Boise 
City Attorney's Office had actual and apparent authority to bind the Coeur 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office in its plea negotiations. (Respondent's brief, pp.S-
11.) Finally, he argues that the doctrine of "fundamental fairness" requires 
enforcement of the Ada County plea agreement to bar the Kootenai County 
prosecution. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-12.) For the reasons that follow, none 
of Baker's arguments have merit. 
B. The Ada County Plea Agreement Was Not Ambiguous And, Even If It 
Was, The Ambiguity Did Not Entitle Baker To Dismissal Of The Kootenai 
County Charges 
Baker entered into a plea agreement with the Boise City Attorney's Office 
to resolve the Ada County case. As articulated on the record by Baker's trial 
counsel, the terms of the agreement called for Baker to plead guilty to a single 
count of violating a civil protection order and, in exchange, the "state" agreed not 
to "file" or "pursue" an additional charges arising out of violations of the order 
before February 17, 2010. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Apparently unbeknownst to 
Baker, when he entered the plea agreement to resolve the Ada County case, 
there were already charges pending against him in Kootenai County for 
numerous violations of the same protection order, all occurring before February 
17, 2010. (R., pp.22-24.) The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was not a 
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party to the Ada County plea agreement and, as far as the record shows, was 
not even aware of it. Nevertheless, Baker argues, and the district court agreed, 
that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was bound by the Ada County plea 
agreement to dismiss the already pending Kootenai County charges because the 
word "state" in the Ada County plea agreement was ambiguous and reasonably 
led Baker to believe that the promise to not "file" or "pursue" any other charges 
arising out of violations of the protection order before February 17, 2010, was 
"binding on all Idaho prosecutors." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8; see also R., 
pp.227-29 (concluding word "state" in Ada County plea agreement was 
ambiguous, such that it was reasonable for Baker to believe the agreement 
would "bind all prosecutors in the State of Idaho").) Baker's argument and the 
district court's ruling are incorrect; the word "state" in the orally recited plea 
agreement was not ambiguous and, even if it was, the ambiguity in the Ada 
County plea agreement could not bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office 
to dismiss the already pending Kootenai County charges without the Coeur 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office's consent. 
Whether a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law. State v. 
Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010) (citing State v. Allen, 
143 Idaho 267,272,141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006)). If the language of 
the agreement is ambiguous - i.e., reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations - the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant. State 
v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, _,281 P.3d 90, 94 (2012); Peterson, 148 Idaho at 
595,226 P.3d at 537. If, on the other hand, the language of a plea agreement is 
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not ambiguous, the court "will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement 
to determine the intent of the parties." Gomez, 153 Idaho at _, 281 P.3d at 94 
(citing Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235,241,254 P.3d 1231, 1237 (2011)). 
Idaho's appellate courts have never before considered whether the use of 
the term "state" in a plea agreement binds only the prosecuting agency executing 
the agreement or, instead, binds all prosecutors in the State of Idaho. At least 
one other jurisdiction has concluded, however, that the generic use of the term 
"government" in a plea agreement is not ambiguous and does not alone indicate 
an intention by the parties to bind any prosecuting agency other than the one 
entering into the agreement. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 
(2d Gir. 1998) ("The mere use of the term 'government' in the plea agreement 
does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated 
barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement." 
(citation and internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 
1065 (2d Gir. 1985), overruled on other grounds Qy United States v. Macchia, 41 
F.3d 35 (2d Gir. 1994), (absent evidence to the contrary, the term "the 
government" in orally recited plea agreement applied only to prosecuting agency 
in specific district in which the plea was entered); see also United States v. 
D'Amico, 734 F.Supp.2d 321, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[I]t is well established that 
even when a written plea agreement itself refers to 'the government,' that does 
not make it binding on any USAO other than the USAO entering into the 
agreement." (emphasis original) (citations omitted)). The reasoning of D'Amico 
is particularly instructive. 
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The defendant in D'Amico, a man named Watts, was charged by the 
United States Attorney's Office (USAO) in the Southern District of New York 
(SDNY) with several crimes, including murder.' D'Amico, 734 F.Supp.2d at 328-
29. Watts moved to dismiss the murder charge, arguing the prosecution of that 
charge was barred by a prior plea agreement he had entered into with USAO in 
the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). !Q.. at 348. The federal district court 
rejected Watts' argument, first noting that the express terms of the plea 
agreement upon which Watts relied "explicitly limit[ed] its reach to the EDNY, 
stating that it 'cannot bind other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities.'" 
!Q.. at 349. The court then explained that, even if the plea agreement had not 
been so limited, Watts' claim that he :'reasonably understood" the agreement to 
bar subsequent prosecutions in the SDNY had neither factual nor legal support: 
[Watts] offers no meaningful support for his claim that he 
"reasonably understood" the Agreement to bar subsequent 
prosecutions in this District. He does not claim, for example, that 
the SDNY USAO was in any way consulted or involved in the plea 
negotiations. Instead, he merely points to the fact that, at his 
sentencing, EDNY Assistant United States Attorney Laura Ward 
("AU SA Ward") stated that, as per the terms of the Plea 
Agreement, "the government moves to dismiss the remaining 
charges in the indictment." 
AUSA Ward's reference to "the government" is hardly 
noteworthy. First of all, it is well established that even when a 
written plea agreement itself refers to "the government," that does 
not make it binding on any USAO other than the USAO entering 
into the agreement. See Brown, 2002 WL 34244994, at *2; 
Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120. Here, the written Agreement makes no 
reference to "the Government" or "the United States," but rather 
only to "the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District 
of New York," or the "Office." 
Further, in point of fact, because the Government, not the 
EDNY USAO, was the party to the litigation, AUSA Ward correctly 
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referred to "the government" as the entity taking the action of 
moving to dismiss the indictment. Moreover, even in situation 
where it would be more accurate or appropriate to refer to the 
individual USAO, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges in 
open court habitually refer to "the government." Indeed, in 
Salameh and United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 
1985), the Second Circuit found that oral references to "the 
government" by counsel during plea proceedings - oral references 
that were considerably more suggestive of an agreement to bind 
other USAOs that AUSA Ward's statement here - should not be 
interpreted as reflecting any such intent. 
In Abbamonte, for example, defense counsel stated the 
terms of a plea agreement between the defendant and the SONY 
USAO as follows: "The government has agreed that ... this plea 
will cover all charges that could have come about by the 
government arising out of these facts." 759 F.2d at 1072 
(emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by United 
States v. Macchia, 41 F.3d 35, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1994). The panel 
found that there was nevertheless "no indication that the plea 
agreement contemplated any restriction on prosecutions initiated in 
any [other] district." See id. Similarly, in Salameh, defense counsel 
(and the court) stated that under the terms of an "oral supplement" 
to the plea agreement at issue, "the Government will not bring any 
charges arising out of [the defendant's] entry into the United 
States." 152 F.3d at 119 (emphasis added). As in Abbamonte, the 
Second Circuit held that the mere use of the word "Government" 
was not evidence that the agreement contemplated barring 
prosecutions in districts other than the one in which the plea was 
entered. See id. at 119-20. 
D'Amico, 734 F.Supp.2d at 349-50 (emphases, ellipses, brackets and 
parentheses original) (record citations omitted). 
The reasoning of D'Amico and the cases cited therein applies equally to 
the facts of this case. Baker claims he reasonably understood the Ada County 
plea agreement to bind "all Idaho prosecutors" because, in orally reciting the 
terms of the plea agreement, Baker's attorney represented that the "state" 
promised not to pursue any additional protection order violations. (Respondent's 
brief, p.6.) As in D'Amico, however, Baker does not claim, nor does the record 
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indicate, that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office (or any other prosecuting 
agency in the State of Idaho) was in any way consulted or involved in the plea 
negotiations that resolved the Ada County case. Instead, Baker's argument 
rests entirely on his claim that the "term 'State' is vague as it could refer to the 
prosecutors in Ada County or all prosecutors in the state of Idaho." 
(Respondent's brief, p.6.) Baker has failed to show any ambiguity in the plea 
agreement because his proposed interpretation, while theoretically possible, is 
ultimately not reasonable. See State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491,497,283 P.3d 
808, 814 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]o determine whether a contract, including a plea 
agreement, is ambiguous, the Court's task is to ascertain whether the contract is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." (Citations and internal quotations 
omitted)). 
Just as the parties and judges in federal prosecutions "habitually refer to 
'the government''' when speaking of an individual USAO, see D'Amico, 734 
F.Supp.2d at 350, the parties and judges in state prosecutions routinely use the 
term "state" as a shorthand way to refer to the particular prosecuting agency that 
is appearing in the case. It defies reason to suggest that, in any prosecution in 
which the parties reach a plea agreement that purports to bind both the 
defendant and the "state," every prosecutor in the state is bound by the terms of 
that agreement. Unless the agreement otherwise specifically contemplates that 
other prosecuting agencies will be bound, the only reasonable interpretation of 
the word "state" in a plea agreement is that it refers only to the prosecuting 
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agency that is a party to the agreement. kL see also Salameh, 152 F.3d at 119-
20; Abbamonte, 759 F.2d at 1072. 
The record in this case shows that the Ada County case was prosecuted 
by the Boise City Attorney's Office, acting in its appointed capacity as the 
Meridian City Prosecutor. (11/5/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.13-23.) The record also shows 
that it was the Boise City Prosecutor's Office that entered into the plea 
agreement with Baker to resolve the Ada County Case. (11/5/10 Tr., p.43, L.25 
- p.44, L.10; Defendant's Exhibit A.) Although Baker's attorney recited that the 
"state" agreed not to pursue any additional charges arising out of Baker's 
violation of the protection order (Defendant's Exhibit A), there is no indication in 
the terms of the plea agreement or otherwise that the term "state" referred to any 
prosecuting agency other than the one with whom Baker was directly dealing. 
Baker's interpretation to the contrary is unreasonable and does not demonstrate 
an ambiguity in the plea agreement. 
Even if the term "state" in the orally recited Ada County plea agreement 
was ambiguous, Baker is not entitled to relief from his Kootenai County 
convictions. There is no question that ambiguities in plea agreements are 
construed in favor of the defendant. Gomez, 153 Idaho at _, 281 P.3d at 94; 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537. However, absent a showing that 
the Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor's Office was a party to the Ada County plea 
agreement, or that the Boise City Prosecutor's Office otherwise had actual or 
apparent authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office, any 
ambiguity in the Ada County plea agreement could only inure to Baker's favor in 
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the Ada County case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.18-19 (citing State v. Barnett, 
707 N.#.2d 564, 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (ambiguous or not, plea agreement 
entered into by one county without second county's consent could not prevent 
prosecution in second county of crimes occurring in that county). For the 
reasons already set forth in the state's opening brief and incorporated herein by 
reference, if Baker believed, based upon the wording of the agreement he 
entered into with the Boise City Prosecutor's Office, that he could not be 
prosecuted by any other prosecuting agency for crimes arising out of his 
protection order violations, his remedy was withdrawal of his plea in the Ada 
County case, not dismissal of the Kootenai County charges. (See generally 
Appellant's brief, pp.7-18.) 
C. There Is No Evidence That Venue Over The Kootenai County Charges 
Was Also Proper In Ada County; Even If Such Evidence Had Been 
Presented, The Fact That The Kootenai County Charges Could Have 
Been Prosecuted In Ada County Did Not Vest The Boise City Attorney's 
Office With Authority To Dismiss The Kootenai County Charges 
Idaho Code § 19-304(1) sets forth the appropriate venue for offenses 
committed in different counties. Specifically, the statute provides: 
Offenses committed in different counties. - (1) When a public 
offense is committed in part in one (1) county and in part in 
another, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the 
consummation of the offense occur in two (2) or more counties, the 
venue is in either county. 
Relying on this statute, Baker argues that the Boise City Prosecutor's Office had 
authority to prevent the Kootenai County prosecution because the telephone 
calls that were the subject of the Kootenai County charges originated in Ada 
County and, as such, venue over the Kootenai County charges was also proper 
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in Ada County. (Respondent's brief, pp.7-S.) Baker's argument is without merit 
for two reasons. 
First, contrary to Baker's assertions and the district court's conclusion, 
Baker never presented any evidence in connection with his motion to dismiss to 
establish that the telephone calls that were the subject of the Kootenai County 
charges originated in Ada County. (See generally 1 0/S/1 0 Tr., pp.1S-40.) In fact, 
the magistrate specifically found based on the lack of such evidence that venue 
was proper in Kootenai County, where the victim was alleged to have received 
the telephone calls. (11/5/10 Tr., p.46, L.6 - p.47, L.23.) Baker represents to 
this Court that "[t]he trial court was provided an affidavit signed by Mr. Baker, 
who lives and works in Ada County, and was in Ada County when he made all 
the phone calls that are the basis of all the charges in [the Kootenai County] 
case." (Respondent's brief, p.7.) Baker neglects to mention, however, that he 
filed that affidavit almost two months after the district court denied his motion to 
dismiss, in support of a motion for change of venue. (Compare R., pp.74-75 
(order denying motion to dismiss filed 11/10/10), with pp.77-7S (motion to 
change venue, filed 1/2S/11), and pp.S1-S2 (Affidavit of Carey Baker, filed 
2/1/11); see also 2/1/11 Tr., p.63, L.7 - p.66, L.16.) Because Baker did not 
present any evidence in relation to his motion to dismiss to establish that venue 
over the Kootenai County charges was also proper in Ada County, his argument 
that the Kootenai County charges should have been dismissed on the basis of 
concurrent venue necessarily fails. 
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Even if venue over the Kootenai County charges was proper in both 
Kootenai and Ada Counties, such did not give the Boise City Prosecutor's Office 
authority to prevent the Kootenai County prosecution of the 11 protection order 
violations of which Baker was ultimately convicted. Pursuant to I.C. § 50-
208A(2), city attorneys are authorized to prosecute "those violations of county or 
city ordinances, state traffic infractions, and state misdemeanors committed 
within the municipal limits." (Emphasis added.) See also I.C. § 31-2604(1) 
(duty of county prosecutor to "prosecute or defend all actions, applications or 
motions, civil or criminal, in the district court of his county in which the people, 
or the state, or the county, are interested, or are a party ... " (emphasis added)). 
Because city attorneys are only authorized to prosecute offenses committed 
within the municipal limits in which they are appointed, it follows that they cannot 
prevent the prosecution of offenses committed in a different municipality. This is 
true even if venue over the offense is proper in both places. 
Idaho Code § 19-304(1) dictates only that, when a public offense is 
committed partially in one county and partially in another, venue lies in either 
county. That venue may be proper in more than one county pursuant to I.C. § 
19-304(1) does not divest a city prosecutor of his or her statutorily authorized 
discretion to charge a crime that indisputably occurred at least in part within the 
limits of the specific municipality in which he or she is appointed. In fact, the only 
statutory limitations on such authority arise out of I.C. § 19-305, which provides 
"that a prosecution in one (1) county shall be a bar to a prosecution for the same 
act or offense in the other county" (emphasis added), and I.C. § 19-316, which 
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provides that U[wJhen an offense is within the venue of two (2) or more counties, 
a conviction or acquittal thereof in one county is a bar to a prosecution or 
indictment therefor in another." These limitations (which are essentially statutory 
bars against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense) have no 
application in this case, however, because Baker was ultimately not prosecuted 
or convicted in the Kootenai County case of the "same act or offense" of which 
he was convicted in Ada County pursuant to the Ada County plea agreement. 1 
Even if venue over the Kootenai County charges was also proper in Ada 
County, the Boise City Prosecutor's Office did not have authority to prevent the 
prosecution of Baker in Kootenai County for the 11 protection order violations 
that occurred at least in part in that county. Baker's argument to the contrary is 
without merit. 
D. The Boise City Prosecutor's Office Had Neither Actual Nor Apparent 
Authority To Bind The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office In The Plea 
Negotiations That Resolved The Ada County Case 
The state argued in its opening brief that the Boise City Prosecutor's 
Office had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City 
Attorney's Office in the plea negotiations that resolved the Ada County case. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-19.) In response, Baker notes a split of authority on this 
issue but argues that "the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Statutes, indicate county 
1 The Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor's Office originally charged Baker with 12 
counts of violating the civil protection order, with one of the counts, Count VI, 
being based on the same act that gave rise to Baker's prosecution in Ada 
County. (R., pp.22-24.) The magistrate dismissed Count VI before trial, 
concluding that prosecution of that charge in Kootenai County was barred by 
statute (presumably I.C. § 19-305). (R., pp.72, 74; 11/5/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.2-22.) 
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prosecutor's [sic] can bind one another to agreements made with defendants." 
(Respondent's brief, p.S; see also p.11 ("[S]tate prosecutors have actual and 
apparent authority to bind one another through their plea agreements because 
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Statutes indicate their authority is not limited to 
their prospective county lines).) Baker is incorrect. 
As noted by the state in its opening brief and again in Section C, supra, 
Idaho Code § 50-20SA(2) specifically limits the authority of a city attorney to 
prosecute only those crimes committed within the limits of the municipality in 
which the attorney is appointed. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Because, by 
statute, the Boise City Attorney's Office's authority did not extend beyond 
municipal lines, it did not have actual or apparent authority to prevent the Coeur 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office from pursuing its prosecution of Baker for the 11 
civil protection order violations that were committed in the city limits of Coeur 
d'Alene. (Id.) 
Baker does not even cite I.C. § 50-20SA(2), much less attempt to explain 
why that statute does not control the outcome of this case. Instead, Baker relies 
on the constitutional provision and statutes dealing with the authority of county 
prosecutors to prosecute crimes in the State of Idaho. Baker's reliance on these 
provisions is misplaced because both the Ada County and Kootenai County 
prosecutions were instituted by an office of the city attorney, not by the 
prosecuting attorney for each respective county. Nevertheless, to the extent the 
constitutional and statutory provisions on which Baker relies are even relevant, 
nothing therein supports Baker's assertion that prosecutors from different 
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counties can bind one another to their plea agreements without the other's 
consent. 
Article V, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution, relied on by Baker, merely 
provides for the election in every county of a single prosecuting attorney who, 
among other things, "shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law." 
Those duties are specifically set forth in I.C. § 31-2604, which provides in 
relevant part: 
Duties of prosecuting attorney. - It is the duty of the 
prosecuting attorney: 
1. To prosecute or defend all actions, applications or motions, 
civil or criminal, in the district court of his county in which the 
people, or the state, or the county, are interested, or are a party; 
and when the place of trial is changed in any such action or 
proceeding to another county, he must prosecute or defend the 
same in such other county. 
I.C. § 31-2604(1) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the plain language of this 
statute, the authority of a county prosecutor to prosecute criminal actions is 
limited to those actions "in the district court of his county." The only exception to 
this limitation exists "when the place of trial is changed ... to another county," in 
which such case the prosecutor "must prosecute or defend the same in such 
other county." Nothing in this statute permits a county prosecutor to initiate a 
criminal prosecution in any county of his or choosing, nor does it permit an 
elected prosecutor in one county to otherwise usurp the authority of an elected 
prosecutor in a second county by deciding whether criminal charges should be 
pursued in the second county. 
Neither I.C. §§ 1-1622 nor 19-304, relied on by Baker, compel a contrary 
conclusion. Idaho Code § 1-1622 simply confers on judicial officers "all the 
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means necessary" to carry out the authority granted to them by statute. Because 
the authority granted to county prosecutors is limited by statute to the 
prosecution of criminal actions "in the district court of his county," I.C. § 31-
2604(1), nothing in I.C. § 1-1622 would confer upon county prosecutors the 
authority to prosecute, dismiss or negotiate the resolution of a criminal action 
pending in the district court of another county. Likewise, for the reasons already 
set forth in Section C, supra, the fact that venue over criminal offenses may be 
appropriate in more than one county pursuant to I.C. § 19-304 does not give the 
prosecuting attorney of one county authority to prevent the prosecution of those 
criminal offenses in another county where venue is also appropriate unless, of 
course, the prosecution is barred by I. C. §§ 19-305 and/or 19-316 and/or double 
jeopardy. 
In short, nothing in Idaho's constitution or statutory provisions supports 
Baker's argument that the individual prosecuting agencies of this state have 
authority (either actual or apparent) to bind each other to their respective plea 
agreements without the other prosecuting agency's consent. This Court should 
therefore adopt the reasoning of the cases cited in the state's opening brief and 
hold, consistent therewith, that the Boise City Attorney's Office had neither actual 
nor apparent authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Office in the plea 
negotiations that resolved the Ada County case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-19.) 
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E. The Doctrine Of "Fundamental Fairness" Does Not Compel Dismissal Of 
The Kootenai County Charges 
Baker argues that, even if the Boise City Attorney's Office had no 
authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office to the Ada County plea 
agreement, the doctrine of "fundamental fairness" nevertheless dictates that he 
"be free from prosecution for the eleven no contact order violations" in the 
Kootenai County case. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-12.) The state acknowledges 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a 
requirement of fundamental fairness in all criminal proceedings. !;.,lb State v. 
Green, 149 Idaho 706, 709, 239 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64,66, 156 P.3d 
565, 567 (2007); Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19, 576 P.2d 1052, 
1053 (1978». Contrary to Baker's assertions, however, "fundamental fairness" is 
not itself a freestanding claim that allows a defendant to avoid proving a violation 
of a recognized due process right. See State v. Bartlett, 2013 WL 500394, *6 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 292 P.3d 258 
(2012» ("Even an assertion based on fundamental fairness, which is akin to the 
claim in this case, requires a due process analysis."). The state submits that, 
because Baker has demonstrated no violation of any statutory or constitutional 
right, he has failed to show any fundamental unfairness. Even if, however, the 
doctrine of "fundamental fairness" extends beyond explicit constitutional or 
statutory rights, Baker has shown no unfairness, fundamental or otherwise; 
contrary to Baker's assertions on appeal, there was nothing fundamentally unfair 
about not requiring the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office to dismiss the 
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already pending Kootenai County charges based upon the Ada County plea 
agreement to which the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was not a party and 
otherwise did not consent. 
Baker's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no evidence in 
the record that either the Boise City Attorney's Office or Coeur d'Alene City 
Attorney's intentionally misled Baker or otherwise acted in bad faith. Although 
the record suggests the Boise City Attorney's Office was aware when it entered 
the Ada County plea agreement that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office 
was also pursuing or, at least, investigating protection order violations that were 
reported in Kootenai County (see Appellant's brief, p.3, n.3), there is no 
indication in the record that the Boise City Attorney's Office actively withheld that 
information from Baker. Nor is there any evidence that the Boise City Attorney's 
Office intended by the Ada County plea agreement to mislead Baker into 
believing that the agreement to not file or pursue any additional charges arising 
out of Baker's violations of the protection order was binding on every prosecutor 
in the State. Indeed, for the reasons already set forth in Section B, supra, the 
only reasonable interpretation of the Ada County plea agreement was that it 
bound only the Boise City Prosecutor's Office, as that was the only prosecuting 
agency that was a party to the agreement that resolved the Ada County case. 
In arguing that it was fundamentally unfair to allow the Kootenai County 
charges to proceed, Baker places great emphasis on the fact that, at his 
sentencing in the Ada County case, the Boise City prosecutor played a recording 
of the telephone messages that were the subject of the Kootenai County 
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prosecution. (Respondent's brief, p.12.) As noted by the magistrate in denying 
Baker's motion to dismiss, however, that the Boise City prosecutor relied on the 
recording "in aggravation of [Baker's] sentence" did not mean that Baker could 
not be prosecuted for that same conduct by another prosecuting agency in 
another county where venue was also appropriate. (11/5/10 Tr., p.50, Ls.14-21.) 
If Baker believed he could not be so prosecuted under the terms of the Ada 
County plea agreement, he was not without a remedy; upon being arrested on 
the Kootenai County charges Baker could have moved to withdraw his plea in 
the Ada County case or, alternatively, could have sought post-conviction relief 
from his Ada County conviction. That Baker would prefer dismissal of the 
Kootenai County charges, even though the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office 
was neither aware of nor a party to the Ada County plea agreement, does not 
demonstrate that the prosecution of him in Kootenai County was fundamentally 
unfair. See Green 149 Idaho at 710, 239 P.3d at 815 ("The Due Process Clause 
requires procedures that afford fundamental fairness, not procedures that are 
maximally beneficial to the defendant .... "). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision that reversed the magistrate's order denying 
Baker's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 3rd day of April 2013. 
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